Recently, several documents surfaced in the United States, reportedly captured by the IDF in Gaza. While their authenticity is still unclear, some details seem plausible, matching reports from other sources, and are therefore worth noting.
According to a report in The Washington Post, on the eve of the October 7 attack last year, Hamas had plans not only to strike southern Israel but also to blow up residential and commercial towers in Tel Aviv. These included the Azrieli Towers and the Moshe Aviv Tower in the Stock Exchange district, a 68-story building. Hamas also intended to attack Israel’s railway network, using the trains to transport both terrorists and explosives.
The plan involved a coordinated assault from the south (by Hamas itself), the north (with Hezbollah and Syrian militias), and the east (with Iran and Iraqi militias). To execute this, Hamas requested hundreds of millions of dollars from Iran to finance and train an additional 12,000 terrorists in Iran.
In preparation, Hamas compiled an extensive database containing 17,000 images of Israeli targets. Some were taken by satellites, while others were gathered through drones and social media. Their plans also included detailed maps and documents.
In another revelation published by The New York Times, it was reported that Hamas leadership had held secret discussions, deciding to deceive Israel by creating the false impression that Hamas had no interest in war. Unfortunately, as we now know, this deception was entirely successful. This was Israel’s assessment of the situation just before the Sukkot holiday, as we have since learned.
The New York Times also revealed that Hamas tried to persuade Iranian and Hezbollah leaders to join them. At a meeting held just three months before the Sukkot attack, it was made clear that „Iran and Hezbollah support the plan but need more time to prepare.“
However, as we now know, Hamas decided not to wait for their allies to complete their preparations. This decision by Hamas leadership turned out to be a miracle for Israel, as it allowed the country to avoid a much larger and more coordinated attack.
*Why did Hamas rush the attack?*
The reasons are still unclear, but several factors mentioned in the documents seem to have influenced Hamas’ decision to act sooner than planned:
First, Israel’s development of laser weapons, which could significantly reduce the threat posed by rockets.
Second, Hamas was eager to disrupt negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia concerning Saudi Arabia’s potential inclusion in the Abraham Accords.
Lastly, Hamas leaders were deeply alarmed by the increasing Jewish presence in Jerusalem, Judea, and Samaria — the „expansion of the settlement movement“ (mainly due to efforts by Finance Minister Smotrich) and the „strengthened Jewish control over the Temple Mount“ (largely attributed to Internal Security Minister Ben-Gvir).
Alongside constant reports in Israeli media about internal societal divisions and mass refusals to serve in the military, all of this pushed Hamas leaders to launch a premature attack. They hoped that Iran and Hezbollah would eventually join them, either immediately or later during the conflict.
By the grace and miracle of the Almighty, this did not happen. Iran and Hezbollah stayed on the sidelines and did not participate in or assist with the attack — at least not in the initial days. This gave Israel valuable, crucial time to mobilize tens of thousands of reservists, quickly equipping them with tanks and armoured vehicles and deploying them to the north to face Hezbollah. Simultaneously, Israel’s air defence system and air force were fully mobilised to prepare for any possible threat from Iran, which ultimately refrained from active involvement in the fighting.
Praise the Lord, for He is good, for His mercy endures forever!